Wanted: A Policy to end Small Arms Smuggling more

GEOPOLITICS INTERNALS ECURITY UNITED STATES boasts of 89 guns for 100 persons in the count of civilian forearm pos- session. The only South Asian country that makes it to the rather ignominious list is Pakistan with about 12 guns per 100 persons, India fares better with only 4.2 guns per 100 persons. However, this statistics is hardly a matter of solace as in terms of the actuals, the estimate of the number of privately-held guns in India is 46 million, of which only 5.5 million are registered. The rest are available to the crim- inals, insurgents as well as anybody interest- ed in possessing one. The impact of the pro- liferation has been serious for the country and the problem is only growing. The following is an analysis of the avail- ability of small arms for the insurgent/ extremist groups in the country. MaoistArms Naxalites in the 1960s fought oppressive landlords and the Indian state with rudi- mentary weapons. As a result, clashes with security forces with better arms were one- sided and resulted in the near wipeout of the extremists. The Communist Party of India- Maoist (CPl-Maoist)'s protracted armed struggle that uses guerrilla warfare as a key strategy, however, has come a long way since those days. Today, Naxalites (left-wing extremists) use the most sophisticated arms and explosives to carry out their strikes, Naxalites/Maoists for long have claimed that the arms they use are primarily sourced from security forces, though they are known ' to have received some arms and techniques of assembling lEDs from the LITE. Andhra Pradesh police sources indicate that in the late 1980s, the People's War Group (PWG) had reportedly acquired 60 AK-47s and 20 Stenguns from the LTTE. In an interview CPI-Maoist General Secretary Ganapathy said in November 2010, "Our weapons are mainly country-made. All the modern weapons we have are mainly seized from the government aimed forces when we attack them. The enemy himself knows that seizure of arms is our main source for getting weapons." The country-made weapons Ganapathy MAOIST MENACE: Proliferation of arms is seen as a key element in derailing the already fragile peace process A POLICY TO END SMALL ARMS SMUGGLING While the flow of illegal arms — used by insurgent outfits in the Northeast as well as Maoists from Myanmar and Thailand — has decreased, thanks to the present Awami League-led Bangladesh government, BIBHU PRASAD ROUTRAYbelieves that the country must take adequate steps to formulate a policy to end the trafficking of arms www. geopolitics, in K3J t>-3 March 2011 referred to are manufactured in several arm manufacturing units the outfit runs in its lib - erated zones in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. In Tamil Nadu, Maoists had attempted to set up a rocket-launcher-manufacturing centre before it was busted in 2006. In addition, Maoists also procure their weapons from the private criminalised arms manufacturing units in Bihar, Uttar. Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. In the past, raids on state armouries added significantly to the weapons of Maoists. A number of raids were organised in 2006 and 2007, the most notable being the attack on the Nayagarh armoury in Orissa on February 15, 2008, that added almost 300 weapons to the Maoists. While the extremists had looted 1085 weapons, the police was able to recover 764 weapons including 159 burnt ones. In fact, the total ammunition looted numbered about 1, 00,000, and about 53,566 were recovered. These weapons were distributed to Maoist cadres ail over the country, which is evident from the fact that some of these weapons have since been recovered from arrested Maoists in different states. Raids on police facilities as a method of arms acquisition for the Maoists have become increasingly difficult. Police depart- ments in different states have strengthened the security of the police stations by bringing in design and structural changes and also by deploying more men to stand guard. As a consequence, no raid on a police armoury www geopolitics.in has taken place since the Nayagarh attack. Maoists did try to overrun the NALCO mine in Koraput in April 2009 in search of a huge cache of gelatin explosives meant to be used for blasting the hilltop for mining but the attack was repulsed by the CISF personnel deployed. Maoists, however, managed to loot huge quantities of sophisticated arms and ammunition from the para-military force armoury there. On several occasions, however, Maoists have managed to inflict heavy casualty on police and para-military personnel and loot the weapons of the dead and injured forces. In April 2010, for example, Maoists wiped out an entire company of the CRPF in Chhattis- garh and took away the arms from the dead personnel. Conflict 'Transformation' in the Northeast Insurgency in many of the states of the northeastern region has finally demonstrat- ed signs of abatement. For decades, outfits thrived with their external linkages and internal support. Most of these outfits, like many insurgency movements in the world, remained personality-centric. As a result, once Bangladesh started cooperating and handing over insurgent leaders, who were based in that country, to India, the insur- gents operating in Assam and Meghalaya ran out of steam. It is Bangladesh's cooperation, which is behind the initiation of peace talks between a faction of the ULFA and the Gov- ernment of India. Bangladesh also recently handed over the Chief of United National Liberation Front (UNLF), one of the most violent groups in Manipur, to India. Before this, police-led operations in Tripura had neutralised the insurgency movement in Tripura. In addition, there are a host of out- fits including the Naga outfits, which have been observing ceasefire and some of them are currently negotiating with the govern- ment. A conflict transformation process is underway in the volatile Northeast. This, however, could be the source of fresh problems for the country. In a bid to bring the violent outfits to the negotiating table at any cost, the government has made no effort to make weapons surrender mandatory. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), since its ceasefire with the government in 1997, has augmented both its cadre strength and weapons holding tremendously. In case of surrendering cadres belonging to outfits based in neighbouring countries, it was argued that insurgents who have been escaping from their hideouts in Bangladesh and Myanmar cannot be expected to carry 'heavy' weapons along with them. Also, in many cases, weapons surrendered by some outfits that surrendered en masse were much below the intelligence inputs of their actual weapons holding. Ail this has created a situation in the region, where armed con- flicts are ending without any of the weapons in the possession of the outfits coming to the government. It is virtually unimaginable that _ March 2011 INTERNAL SECURITY these weapons would lie secure and would not be passed to other outfits that need them, An early indication of this possible trend was provided on February 12, 2011, when security forces during a combing operation arrested Aditya Bora, a senior ULFA cadre and two of his associates in the Saranda for- est bordering Orissa-Jharkhand. Saranda forest, which includes terri- tories of both Orissa and Jharkhand, has been a lib- erated zone of the CPI- Maoist for the last few years. Explosives, Maoist literature and posters were seized from these ULFA cadres, who were in the area to supply arms and explosives to the CPI- Maoist cadres. Linkages between the CPI-Maoist and the north- eastern militants have developed in the past years. The CPI-Maoist has signed agreements of solidarity with a couple of insurgent outfits operating in Manipur. In these agree- ments, the signing parties have vowed to collaborate and cooperate in extending the people's war. Intelli- gence sources have further indicated that meetings between these groups have taken place in some foreign locations. However, this was probably the first occa- sion when cadres of the northeastern groups — more importantly belong- ing to a group from Assam — were arrested from Maoist strongholds. It merely confirms the specu- lation that the solidarity agreements are bound to turn into active collabora- tions for arms and explo- sives. In time to come, as _ more and more northeast- ern outfits start negotiating with the govern- ment, arms in their possession will find their way to active outfits, in particular to the CPI- Maoist. 'Peace' Zones as Arms Bazaars Contrary to the prevalent wisdom that views active conflict theatres as the areas where contraband arms are freely available, the so-called peaceful areas of the northeast like Mizoram and Meghalaya have turned into arms bazaars. Meghalaya for long was on the arms route between India and Bangladesh and signifi- cant amount of small arms and explosives entered the country through the Garo hills region from Bangladesh. Among the outfits MAOIST ARMOURY: A range of deadly devices are available under one roof for purchase in different states of the country that participated and benefited from the trade were die NSCN-IM and the ULFA. Rare arrests of such militants have provided an insight into the trade. On January 19, 2007, police personnel arrested two ULFA mili- tants from Bhoirymbong area near Umroi airport in Shiliong and recovered three kilo- grams of RDX and a 9-min pistol from them. Basumatary subsequently admitted to have bought the arms from Bangladesh exclusive- ly for the 27th battalion of the ULFA. On March 21, 2007, ULFA militant Ratneswar Rabha was shot dead while crossing over from Bangladesh near Jengjal in the West Garo Hills district. Three kilograms of RDX was recovered from the killed militant. How- ever, with the installation of the friendly Awami League gov- ernment in Dhaka, this route has dried up. Even so, the Meghalaya capital of Shiliong and its adjoining areas con- tinue to gain notoriety as a vibrant small arms bazaar for many insurgent groups. Country-made revolvers were avail- able for a mere ?2500 — against the ^6500 for a branded revolver — from makeshift arm- manufacturing units that mush- roomed in ateas like Cherrapunjee and Mawsynram in East Khasi Hills district. Police busted several makeshift arms facto- ries but as soon as the police turned their back, the factories sprung up again. It was possible to get Chinese-made '5-star' pistols for less than ?20,000 in Shiliong not too long ago. Similarly, prevail- ing peace in Mizoram and the consequent security force inertia probably facilitated the Mizoram and Myanmar border being used as a thriv- ________________ lug small arms route. Arms continue to enter India through areas like Champhai, Saiha and Zawkathawr and find their way into the war chest of the insurgents. Troubled Neighbourhood Union Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) P Chidambaram addressing the annual Chief Ministers' Conference on Internal Security www, geopolitics, in March 2011 1 on February 1, 2011, identified 'arms smug- gling' as a'consequence' of India being locat- ed in a troubled neighbourhood. While there is little to doubt about the Minister's claim, India's counter-measures to tackle the men- ace remain a problem. Bangladesh, as mentioned earlier, is fast ceasing to be a direct source of small arms for the northeastern militant groupings. The AL-led government has initiated several steps to stop the country from being a hub for for anti-India activities. High-ranking officials belonging to intelligence units have been arrested and prosecuted for their active participation in incidents like the Chittagong arms haul of April 1,2004, in which 10 truck- loads of arms and ammunition meant for the northeastern insurgents were recovered. The fact, however, remains that in spite of its commitment, Dhaka's ability to enforce a complete ban on this trade will remain sus- pect, given its rather limited clout in areas including the Chittagong Hills Tracts, where a bulk of the transactions occur. The demand for small arms from Bangladesh's own crimi- nal networks will continue and a fraction of the arms delivered at places like Chittagong port will eventually find their way into India. It is in New Delhi's interest that the hands of the India-friendly AL government are strengthened and its writ extended to the ungoverned spaces. In the event of a return www.geopolitics.in of the hostile Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 'to power in future, the strategic advantage accrued so far, will be lost. China stopped supporting the Northeast- ern insurgent outfits sometime in the mid- 1990s. The ULFA's appeal for a free passage through China during {he December 2003 military operations in Bhutan did not elicit a response from the Chinese authorities. Even so, China continues to remain a source of small arms for insurgent groups in India. According to available information, in 2006 and 2007, security agencies seized nearly 4,000 small arms and light weapons in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir and nearly half of these were made in China. In 2008, an independent report verified that China had replaced Cambodia and Thailand as the main supplier of weapons to insurgent groups in India's Northeast and Myanmar. Elaborating on the lucrative trade, the report had also said that a Chinese automatic rifle that was available for $500 in eastern Myan- mar could command a price of $2,500 by the time it reached the Northeast. Indian intelli- gence agencies apparently do not have any evidence of the involvement of official agen- cies of China in the arms deals, although inputs have periodically thrown up names of retired PIA officials. In fact, the NSCN-IM till very recently, had stationed an arms procur- er in Dhaka, who shuttled between Thailand and Philippines, meeting his Chinese con- tact in search for arms and explosives. The arms route from China invariably passes through Myanmar and involves Myanmarese insurgents and also officials. A number of Northeastern insurgent camps are located within Myanmar and these serve as the first unloading points from the arms cache, before being brought into the coun- try. In the past, the Myanmarese army has carried out operations against the insur- gents, without any permanent impact on the ground. The Indo-Myanmar strategic coop- eration of recent times is yet to translate into joint operations against the insurgents. In addition to the inability of the Myanmarese army to take action, the porous border remains a serious problem. Assam Rifles, the main border guarding force along the Indo- Myanmar border, is clearly short of person- nel and has located itself about 40 kilometres away from the actual border. Though the Assam Rifles is raising an additional 26 bat- talions, it is unclear whether this additional manpower will plug the smuggling routes. Indigenous Production There is a tendency among analysts to play down the capacity of the hundreds of private arm-manufacturing units that have mushroomed all over the country to serve the militants and the insurgents. These units, often located in one-room facilities, are believed to produce only crude weapons, unfit for the use of insurgents. However, over the years, tremendous improvements have been noted in the quality of arms produced from such facilities. Earlier, Ahmedabad and now, Mumbai has emerged as a hub for pur- chase of indigenously produced arms in dif- ferent states. Inputs suggest that a range of weapons including country-made revolvers and sophisticated replica of AK rifles are available with prices ranging from ?5000 to ^50,000. With an advance payment and wait- ing time of a month, even the rarest and most expensive guns like the Austrian Glock pistol and the Uzi submachine gun are also available. Meeting the challenge calls for concerted action, both in terms of plugging the smug- gling routes and also controlling the internal trade. However, any such action can only stem from a policy, which is non-existent. (The author has served as a Deputy Direc- tor at the National Security Council Secre- tariat, New Delhi, and is currently, a Visiting Research Feilow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore) _J March 2011