Central Asia: Islamic Extremism and Terrorist Violence in the 21st century more

published in Research Program on Foreign Policy, Defence & Security, Center of Russia, Eurasia & Southern Europe (CERE), Institute of International Relations (IIR), vol. 3, pp. 3-7, 2012, http://ceregreece.org.

Central Asia: Islamic Extremism and Terrorist Violence in the 21st century. Central Asia has been offered both the fortune and the hardship to be situated in one of the most geostrategic locations of the world, in the core of Eurasia that seminally Zbigniew Brzezinski once coined as “the center of world power.”1 Without a doubt, its position between Russia, China, and Iran, and in the crossroads of the trade and energy routes, along with the region’s vast energy resources can be considered as adequate evidence of its importance2. Today, the region is consisted of the former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which declared their independency from the Soviet Union back in 1991. More to the point, the five republics share nowadays not only a common social and cultural heritage3, but also a number of security threats such as: social disorder, crime, corruption, ethnic and civil conflict, water disputes, border tensions, and drug trafficking4. Nevertheless according to a number of authors “the revival and radicalization of Islam” has been the most notable development and the major threat for the post-Soviet Central Asia5. Indeed, the series of terrorist attacks that Kazakhstan experienced in the last months of 2011, most of them committed by a previously unknown Islamic terrorist organization – Jund al-Khilafa (“Soldiers of 1 Zbigniew, Brzezinski (1998), The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, NY, Basic Books, p. xiii. 2 Pop, Irina Ionela (2009), “Russia, EU, NATO, and the Strengthening of the CSTO in Central Asia,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 277. 3 “The examples of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Political extremism, terrorism, and media in Central Asia,” A study by International Media Support (IMS), Copenhagen in cooperation with The International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech „Adil Soz“ (Almaty, Kazakhstan), and The Public Association “Journalists” (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), August 2008, http://www.i-ms.dk/files/publications/1353%20CentralAsia%20GB.web.pdf 4 Nichol, Jim (2010), “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, March 11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30294.pdf 5 McGlinchey, Eric (2005), “Autocrats, Islamists, and the Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia,” Current History, vol. 104, no. 684, p. 336. the Caliphate)6, have once again highlighted the enduring and critical problem of Islamic extremism that the whole region of Central Asia has been facing since the demise of the USSR. In fact, the latest and most appalling incident, the suicide bombing in Taraz that killed 8 people on the 12th of November, has not only stunned the country, but has also raised its death toll to no less than 30 people, only in 20117. Indeed, “while jihadist terrorism has been a part of the Central Asian political landscape for a long time, these events deserve special attention,”8 as this surprising number of attacks was inflicted to the most stable and secular state of the region9; namely Kazakhstan10. However, the focal point of the Islamic radicalization and extremism has been identified with the Ferghana Valley region, “a densely populated and ethnically a mainly Uzbek territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,”11 where the “Islamic sentiment has already expressed itself [since] the early 1990s.”12 In fact, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have since then been recognized as the most conflict-prone countries of the region 13, as the former gave birth to one of the most dangerous terrorist 6 Zenn, Jacob (2011), “Jund al-Khilafa Operations Expand in Kazakhstan,” Terrorism Monitor, vol. ix, no. 46, December 16, pp. 4-6, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news %5D=38789 7 Lillis, Joanna (2011), “Kazakhstan: Astana Jolted by Terror Incidents,” Eurasianet.org, November 16, http://www.eurasianet.org 8 Shlapentokh, Dmitry (2011), “Jihadists in Kazakhstan and the Increasing instability in Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, November 16, http://cacianalyst.org 9 Cohen, Ariel & Roach, Morgan L. (2011), “Central Asian Terrorism: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Security,” WebMemo, no. 3292, June 13, http://report.heritage.org/wm3292 10 Nonetheless, a tendency of increasing numbers of attacks, especially against policemen, had been recorded in Kazakhstan between 2007 and 2010. See Shlapentokh, Dmitry (2011), op. cit. 11 Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2010), “The Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia,” International Political Science Review, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 170. 12 Cornell, Svante E. & Spector, Regine A. (2002), “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, p. 199. 13 What is more, according to Mariya Omelicheva, there are also more supporters of radical Islam among Uzbeks and Tajiks than among the other ethnic groups of the region. See Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2010), op. cit. organizations, and the latter experienced a vicious five year civil war14. Accordingly, in Uzbekistan have originated the notorious Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), along with its splinter groups the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT); the former has been considered responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Central Asia15, has forged links with al-Qaida16, and has usually operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the NATO forces17. Though in its first steps was mainly against Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan, the IMU has declared several years ago as its main objective to “overthrow the secular governments of Central Asia and to establish an Islamic Caliphate.”18 Nowadays, although the group has been inactive in Uzbekistan since 2001, it continues to operate out of the country’s borders; in fact members of the IJU have been arrested even in Germany in 2007-819. Another radical group that has found fertile ground in Central Asia and has shared the goal of the creation of a caliphate in the region is Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Liberation - HT). However, HT is first of all a political organization with international activity that initially appeared in Central Asia in the middle of the 1990s 20. Moreover, although the emergence of the group in the area was initially an “Uzbek phenomenon”21, nowadays has thousands of 14 Souleimanov, Emil & Horák, Slavomír (2006), “Islam, Islamism, and Terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia: A Critical Assessment,” OSCE Yearbook, p. 283. 15 Cordesman, Anthony H. (2011), “US State Department and Counter-Terrorism Center Reporting Terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia, August 2010,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, June 29, www.csis.org/burke/reports. 16 Chaudet, Didier (2008), “Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The ‘AlQaedaization’ of Uzbek Jihadism,” Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 35, p. 19. 17 Nichol, Jim (2010), op. cit. 18 Buszynski, Leszek (2005), “Russia's New Role in Central Asia,” Asian Survey, vol. 45, no. 4, p. 547. 19 Chaudet, Didier (2008), op. cit., p. 19. 20 Amanbayeva, Aida (2009), “The Collision of Islam and Terrorism in Central Asia,” Asian Criminology, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 173. 21 Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2010), “Political Islam in Central Asia: The Role of Hizb al-Tahrir,” Eurasia Review, April 21, http://www.eurasiareview.com/21042010political-islam-in-central-asia-the-role-of-hizb-al-tahrir/Ibid. members and supporters in each of the five republics 22. Despite the fact that it “uses propaganda to disseminate its stated goal of the non-violent overthrowing of Western governments,”23 the application of Sharia, and the establishment of the Islamic caliphate, today is not considered as a terrorist organization by the majority of the states globally, including the USA24; nevertheless some of them have already taken measures against it, with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to be one of the first that banned its activity25. Tajikistan also has deeply suffered from extremist violence, since after its independence became not only the terrain of a murderous civil war (1992-1997) between the Communists and the Islamists26, but also unintentionally offered refuge to the IMU, which joined the war in the side of the Islamists and has since then used the country as “a conduit for its operations”27 in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the greater area. Indeed, with the exception of Turkmenistan - whose repressive, almost totalitarian, regime seems that has not allowed the operation of radical Islamist groups inside its borders, with the only exception that of Turkmen prisons28- the other states of Central Asia, namely Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have already been confronting a regional threat in the face of IMU and its splinter groups, according to Didier Chaudet, an “‘Al-Qaedian’ threat,”29 even before the American campaign in Afghanistan. 22 In reality, according to Emmanuel Karagiannis, “HT is as important as the group is one of the most popular pan-Islamic organizations, counting tens of thousands of members” internationally. Ibid. 23 Amanbayeva, Aida (2009), op. cit., p. 173. 24 Whine, Michael (2006), “Is Hizb ut-Tahrir Changing Strategy or Tactics?”, Center for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper, Series I (Hizb ut-Tahrir), no.1, Washington, DC, Hudson Institute. 25 Brletich, Samantha (2008), “Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the rise,” International Relations and Security Network (ISN), August 8, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/About-Us/Who-we-are 26 As it is estimated 50.000 Tajiks died in the civil war. McGlinchey, Eric (2005), op. cit., p. 338. 27 Menon, Rajan (2003), “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, p. 190 28 Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2010), op. cit., p. 171. 29 Chaudet, Didier (2008), op. cit., p. 4. On the other hand, a number of analysts suggest that the spread of extremism and the “threat of Islamist fundamentalism [have been used by the authoritarian regimes of the region] as a rhetorical instrument to cement their position”30. In fact, all of the states in Central Asia share, in different though extent, the same characteristics: highly concentrated political power in the hands of one person or one ruling elite, limited pluralism, electoral rigging, vast corruption, deprivation of civil liberties and human rights’ violations. Besides, according to the recent patterns of terrorism in the “Stans” the figures, between 2007 and 2010, seem rather undersized (17 attacks/7 deaths/50 wounded), in comparison with the figures in North Africa, Middle East, and South Asia 31. Thus, in a place where social, economic, and political grievances remain unresolved, according to Eric McGlinchey, “Islamist radicalism…is in large part a response to authoritarianism.”32 What is more, according to some the several controls over religious freedom that all the Central Asian states impose currently seem to have different effects than the desired ones33. Then again, the revival of Islam in the Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet reign, not only filled the void that communism left, but also “was viewed as a bridge to national identity” for the indigenous population34. Nonetheless, the authoritarian nature of the Central Asian regimes in conjunction with the strategic manipulation of the discourse on radicalization35, exacerbated in times from the hegemonic security discourse of the “war on terror” during the first decade of the 21st century36, have severely obfuscated the true picture over Islamic extremism in the region. At the end of the day, 30 “The examples of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Political extremism, terrorism, and media in Central Asia,” op. cit., p. 7. 31 Gagel, Andrew C. & Cordesman, Anthony H (2011), “Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, June 29, www.csis.org/burke/reports. 32 McGlinchey, Eric (2005), op. cit., p. 337. 33 Nichol, Jim (2010), op. cit., p. 4. 34 Amanbayeva, Aida (2009), op. cit., p. 172. 35 Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (2010), op. cit., p. 169. the threat of Islamic extremism should be handled with the necessary responsibility - especially under the light of the recent revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring and its possible effects in the region37 - as it still remains considerable, while the authorities should get rid of the practices and the measures over religion freedom that only aggravate the ethnic and civil tensions. 36 Karagulova, Anara & Megoran, Nick (2010), “Discourses of Danger and the ‘War on Terror’: Gothic Kyrgyzstan and the Collapse of the Akaev Regime,” Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 1-20. 37 Blank, Stephen (2012), “Implications of the Arab Spring in Eurasia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, January 11, http://cacianalyst.org.
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