Henri Schmit

I analize the logical and juridical flaws of the German federal electoral law from an external theoretical and comparative standpoint and outline a few ideas for a radical electoral reform. - Im internationalen Vergleich hat Deutschland ein äußerst kompliziertes, aus Wähler-und informierter Laiensicht nicht mehr nachvollziehbares, außerdem prekäres, immer neuen Verfassungsklagen ausgesetztes Wahlsystem. Es wäre außerdem grob undemokratisch, wenn man von der parteiinternen Demokratieauflage absehen würde. Die rechtlichen und logischen Schwächen des BWahlG sind m.E. auf den Doppelproporz im Mischsystem, auf die starren Listen und auf die Sitzverteilungsformel zurückzuführen (Teil 1). Eine umfassende Analyse der Mängel suggeriert bestimmte tiefgreifende Reformideen (Teil 2).

I present a DISSENTING proportional list systems TAXONOMY: The logical-juridical analysis of proportional list systems has to take into account the purpose of the electoral process, i.e. the election of a sovreign assembly composed for a limited time by a number of representatives who are selected, presented and supported by a political party, but who as MPs remain ultimately free to speak, to vote and to change party or group affiliation as they think best. - L'analyse logique des systèmes proportionnels de liste doit tenir compte de l'objectif final de la procédure qui consiste à élire une assemblée composée de représentants individuels, regroupés politiquement, présentés sur des listes, mais sans contrainte de mandat, libres de parler, de voter et choisir le groupe parlementaire ou d'appartenance politique qu'ils veulent. Les systèmes proportionnels peuvent être classés en fonction des modalités de sélection des individus élus.

Depuis plus de deux siècles les chercheurs et les acteurs politiques débattent pour trouver la formule de répartition proportionnelle plus cohérente avec les principes de la démocratie représentative. Les réponses varient dans le temps, d’un pays à l’autre et en fonction de l’objet de la répartition. Une analyse attentive des propriétés logiques des formules permet de choisir la solution la plus appropriée pour les différents usages. - For more than two hundred years political actors and theorists have been debating on the most appropriate seat apportionment formula consistent with the principles of representative democracy. The solutions vary in time, from country to country and depending on the object of apportionment. A careful analysis of the logical properties of the various formulas and their historical use leads to a clear choice of the most appropriate solution for different purposes.

Analyzing the logical criteria of electoral systems of proportional representation I focus on what is commonly known as the Droop quota or the Hagenbach-Bischof electoral number and suggest to rename it the “majority quota”. A system consistent with the majority quota requirement avoids the risk of the worst type of election inversions: a single list that obtains a majority of the votes may receive a minority of the seats. Unlike the two Sainte-Laguë formulas (based either on arithmetic or geometric mean rounding) who violate the requirement, the D'Hondt method satisfies the majority quota condition. I conclude that the Sainte-Laguë formulas are appropriate for fair seat apportionment among territorial fractions, whereas the D'Hondt formula is the coherent solution of proportional list voting systems used for the election of parliamentary assemblies or for the election of select committee in parliamentary assemblies.

Published as a working paaper on Academia.edu, read by close to 300 people, this paper, refused, ahead of any peer review, by three Italian constitutional law journals (because my arguments "are to assertive", because they had "to many articles on their waiting list" or because they did not intend to publish my "opinion") summarises my 2017 critical analysis of the blocked lists system as the major flaw of several successive Italian electoral laws and of the to permissive jurisprudence in this regard.

Published through the ASTRID research network the paper outlines the charactistics of the most used and discussed electoral formulas of proportional list representation. It highlights the majority inversion flaw of the Sainte-Lague formula and the divergent apportionment results on the lower level with double proportional seat allocation models. It defends thus the majority consistent D'Hondt formula and paradox-free final district apportionment model used in Switzerland, Finland and Luxembourg. The 31052021 version of the article integrates footnotes.

Da oltre due secoli si discute per trovare la formula di ripartizione proporzionale più coerente con i principi della democrazia rappresentativa. Le risposte fornite variano nel tempo, da paese a paese e in funzione dell'oggetto della ripartizione. Un'analisi attenta permette di individuare la soluzione più appropriata per ogni tipo d'uso. La versione del 31052021 dell'articolo include note con riferimenti bibliografici e di ricerca.

Interview - article with Annette Welsch published on September 10, 2020 on the Luxemburger Wort and highlighting the major characteristics of my electoral reform proposal argued in "Comment réformer le système électoral?" published in December 2019 by Editech, Luxembourg.

With a view to the constitutional referendum to be hold in september and aiming at reducing by roughly one third the members of the Italian Parliament, the article, published on Lavoce.info, insists on the link between the number of MPs, the electoral system and the form of the Parliament.

This is the abstract of an about 100 pages monography on the ongoing electoral reform debate in Luxembourg published in December 2019 (Legitech, Luxembourg). Since 1919 the Chambre des députés has been elected with a proportional list system in four heterogeneous districts and a multiple vote ballot allowing double preferences for a single candidate and preference votes for candidates of different lists (panachage). I discuss and critize a prominent proposal to introduce a two tier top down proportional list system using the Sainte-Lague seat allocation formula. I suggest an alternative solution of a single tier proportional representation in medium sized homogeneous electoral districts, a single individual preference  vote and the D'Hondt seat allocation formula; I qualify this solution as the best practice of proportional list sytems.

A short version of the present article has been published on February 7, 2020 by Lavoce.info. I try to show that the Irish bicameral model and single transferable vote system could inspire useful reforms of the Italian redundant Senate and much decried lower house electoral system.

Sabato 8 febbraio l'Irlanda va al voto. Gli Irlandesi eleggono con il sistema del voto unico trasferibile una nuova Camera dei rappresentanti che a sua volta eleggerà con lo stesso metodo la maggior parte dei membri del Senato. Solo la Camera vota la fiducia e approva le leggi, mentre il Senato gode di poteri consultivi che possono avere un effetto sospensivo. Sia il parlamento bicamerale che il sistema elettorale potrebbero ispirare utili riforme in Italia.

In this paper, published on June 18, 2020 in a slightly shorter version by Lavoce.info, I distinguish a two-tier argumentation in the German constitutional court sentence, one regarding the valuation of the BCE monetary policy programme, the other overshadowing the first and related to the status and the competencies of the UE with respect to the member states. The link between the two arguments is the power to decide on tax matters and the democratic foundation of tax liability. I criticize the judges’ lower-tier argument based on the principle of proportionality between the monetary policy and its economic and financial effects, but approve their higher-tier axiomatic assessment of the UE as an inter-state organization and the corollary of an exclusive state competence to extend and to interpret the competences transferred to the UE.

L'analisi proposta della sentenza distingue due livelli dell'argomentazione, uno che riguarda la valutazione della politica monetaria della BCE e un altro, spiegazione della conclusione negativa del primo, che riguarda le competenze nell'UE e la democrazia. Quello che collega i due argomenti è il potere di decisione e la responsabilità in materia fiscale. L'autore critica la motivazione della sentenza fondata sul principio di proporzionalità, ma approva l'argomento del potere di decisione democratica rimasto statuale.

The paper published on December 31, 2019 by Lavoce.info stresses the virtues of simplicity and stability of electoral systems which are in sharp contrast to the complexity and the volatility of the Italian practice. The division of the electorate in equal districts is presented as a factor of electoral of simplification, fairness and efficiency.

Un modello elettorale semplice, rispettoso dei diritti e modulabile in termini di frammentazione sarebbe un sistema proporzionale di lista con riparto definitivo in circoscrizioni di piccola dimensione, con una preferenza sola che vale sia per la lista sia per il candidato.

Defining (with William Riker and Pierre Rosanvallon) populism as everything from majority rule abuse to government based on formal or fake majorities, I try to explain the present populist government in Italy as the result of a gradual deterioration, from the mid nineties onwards, of the democratic standard in the public debate and in positive law since the nineties.

In this article published in 2013 on Letzebuerger Land I argue in favour of a remodelling of the Grand Duchy's electoral law praising the advantages of the single individual vote in a proportional list system and equally sized multiseat districts.

In this article, published in an earlier version on Consulta-online, www.giurcost.org, I try to elucidate the logical and juridical relationship, in any democratic voting system, between the candidate preference and the political party choice. I argue that, in constitutional democracies in general and under the Italian Constitution in particular,  the individual preference vote is a fundamental electoral right, while fair party representation is a legitimate but indeterminate, relative and subordinate requisite. If accepted, this insight has far-reaching consequences on the logical and juridical compliance of existing voting procedures.

Italian electoral reform 2016. Basic conditions of electoral  engineering under a liberal-democratic constitution are full compliance with individual voting rights, fair representation, support for consensus building, and simpicity.  A fair compromise would be a single individual voting system with open lists in small homogeneous voting districts.

During the 2017 summer months the Italian Parliament discussed an electoral reform based on the  German model. The article highlights some flaws of the Bundestagswahlgesetz and argues that the most important device in favour of governement stability in Germany is not the electoral system but the rule of constructive non-confidence.

Electoral  list systems comply with the (constitutional) principles of representative democracy only if they they not restrain individual voting rights. Rigid ordinate lists, entirley or partially blocked lists, violate this basic democratic rule.

The paper, published orignally in September 2016 on Letzebuerger Land under the title "Catastrophe annoncée", http://www.land.lu/2016/09/30/catastrophe-annonc%C3%A9e%E2%80%A9/, analyzes the dramatically entangled constitutional and electoral reform project promoted by the Italian governement but rejected on December 4 by popular vote.

This paper, orignally published by Consulta Online: www.giurcost.org/studi/schmit.pdf, argues that the Italian electoral law 52/2015 violates, directly or indirectly, all three basic individual rights in fair democratic elections, formally protected under the existing Constitution (art. 48, 51 and 67): the equal (access) right of all individuals to run as a candidate, the equal (weight) right of all voters to choose their representatives on the exclusive basis of their preferences and (indirectly) the equal right of all elected representatives to speak and to act following their own preference and conscience (free mandate with accountability to electorate).

The paper orignally published on Forum dei Quaderni Costituzionali, www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/images/.../0011_nota_1_2014_schmit.pdf, argues that the Italian Constitutional Court decision 1/2014 does not distinguish adequately between individual electoral rights protecting electors, candidates and representatives, and antithetical political interests in fair party representation and majority building.

I present a DISSENTING proportional list systems TAXONOMY: The logical-juridical analysis of proportional list systems has to take into account the purpose of the electoral process, i.e. the election of a sovreign assembly composed for a limited time by a number of representatives who are selected, presented and supported by a political party, but who as MPs remain ultimately free to speak, to vote and to change party or group affiliation as they think best.  L'analisi logica dei sistemi proporzionali di lista deve tener conto dell'obiettivo della procedura che è quella di eleggere un'assemblea composta da rappresentanti individuali schierati politicamente, presentati su liste solidali, ma senza vincolo di mandato, liberi di cambiare l'affiliazione politica e l'adesione al gruppo parlamentare. I sistemi proporzionali possono essere classificati in base alle modalità di selezione dei singoli eletti.

In the first unpublished paper I analyse critically the Italian Constitutional Court judgments 1/2014 e 35/2017 who accept under certain conditions members of parliament being elected through blocked list voting, and argues instead in favour of full compliance of electoral law with the individual electoral rights firmly anchored in the articles 1, 3, 48, 49, 51, 56, 58 and 67 of the Italian Constitution. The second unpublished 2017 paper is a short form of the first.

This is a short version prepared ahead of the UE summit of July 17-19 of an earlier article "L'Italia, il bilancio europeo, il Recovery fund e il Pandemic Crisis Support del MES". I argue that the interest of the Italian government is to support the Recovery fund as drafted by the Commission, to accept the monitoring role of the Commission and the Council, to insist on the elimination of any rebate on natioal contributions to the UE budget and to put the debate of a fairer coporate tax competition within the UE on the agenda.

Since the early nineties a series of electoral reforms promoting blocked lists have radically changed the Italian political landscape and have profoundly transformed the internal structure of the major parties. Combined with minor constitutional amendments concerning the upper house, the electoral reforms regarding both the Camera dei deputati and the Senate have altered the Italian parliamentary democracy creating two roughly homogeneous houses having exactly the same power. Last year the governing majority approved another amendment aiming at reducing the overall number of members of Parliament; this constitutioanl reform is subject to a referendum to be hold later this year. I criticise both the present and the projected institutional framework. On one hand I suggest to abolish the existing Senate and to re-found it as a small-sized indirectly elected legislative advisory body.  On the other hand I propose to reintroduce the individual preference vote in the electoral system for a down-sized lower house.

Le riforme elettorali degli ultimi decenni hanno introdotto alcuni stratagemmi (indicazione del candidato premier, capilista, candidature multiple, premi di maggioranza), fra cui liste bloccate, che hanno cambiato radicalmente il panorama politico italiano e hanno trasformato profondamente la struttura interna dei principali partiti. Insieme a revisioni minori relative al Senato, i sistemi elettorali utilizzati per entrambi i rami hanno avuto l’effetto di alterare anche il modello parlamentare creando due camere pressoché omogenee (salvo i diritti elettorali attivo e passivo e i regolamenti interni), con gli stessi poteri. L’omogeneizzazione è avvenuta in modo rampante, senza progetto sistemico, per decisione di maggioranze diverse concorde su questo punto; è auspicata come obiettivo da perseguire anche dalla Corte costituzionale e dal Presidente della Repubblica. Una conseguenza del sistema bicamerale quasi puramente procedurale è che il numero di 945 parlamentari poco distinguibili è ritenuto da molti esorbitante. A prescindere dalle motivazioni diverse invocate dai promotori (nel contesto di un attacco di lungo corso ai principi del parlamentarismo liberale sancito in particolare dall’art. 67 C.), il progetto di revisione per ridurre il numero dei parlamentari, approvato dal Parlamento e sottoposto a referendum confermativo, si inserisce oggettivamente, come un’utile correzione, nell’evoluzione verso un bicameralismo solo procedurale. Sembrano tuttavia criticabili sia il quadro istituzionale vigente sia quello promosso dal progetto di revisione. Da un lato sarebbe più coerente abolire il Senato esistente, ormai ridondante, e di rifondarlo come un organo consultivo, con ampi poteri di parere non vincolante e di iniziativa legislativa, poco numeroso, con mandati lunghi, eletto indirettamente per frazioni e in modo sfasato rispetto alle elezioni per la Camera. Dall’altro lato sembra impellente ripristinare una procedura elettorale rispettosa dei principi sanciti dagli art. 48-51 C. reintroducendo, in una forma o in un’altra, il voto di preferenza individuale e di fissare il numero dei deputati tenendo conto del tipo di legge elettorale (sostanzialmente della dimensione delle circoscrizioni) scelto e del grado di rappresentatività desiderato.

Two issues of the French constitutional bill 'For a more representative, more responsible and more efficient democracy', an ordinary law introducing some proportionality in the electoral system for the lower house and a constitutional law reducing the number of members of both houses, dangerously resemble the ambitious Italian government-originated reform project who miserably failed on December 4, 2016. The promoters of the unsuccessful Italian reform have lost most of their political influence after the Constitutional Court ruling against their Parliamentary Elections Act and the popular verdict against their constitutional amendments. Meanwhile, in the wake of regular parliamentary election of March 4, 2018, their government has been replaced by a bipartisan populist coalition. All ingredients are in place to replicate a similar scenario in France, unless those in charge change their mind before it is too late.

L'analisi proposta della sentenza distingue due livelli dell'argomentazione, uno che riguarda la valutazione della politica monetaria della BCE e un altro, spiegazione della conclusione negativa del primo, che riguarda le competenze nell'UE e la democrazia. Quello che collega i due argomenti è il potere di decisione e la responsabilità in materia fiscale. L'autore critica la motivazione della sentenza fondata sul principio di proporzionalità, ma approva l'argomento del potere di decisione democratica rimasto statuale.

The unpublished draft paper analyses the logical and juridical differences between a single winner runoff election (in a single seat constituency or for a presidential office), the runoff method used in a (multiple seat) parliamentary assembly election, and the particular system - used by the Italian lawmakers - of a parliamentary runoff election between blocked candidiate lists.

This unpublished paper is the 2017 version of a 2015 French article on Hobbes' theory of representation. I distinguish Hobbes' two conflicting definitions of person, one traditional (1642) the other innovative (1651), both maintained in Leviathan; I analyse the two types of representation in chapter XVI and try to show why in part II of Leviathan Hobbes chooses, or has to choose, true representation to explain his sovereign-making pact.

In chapter XVI of Leviathan Hobbes presents two possible legal models of political representation, (1) true or voluntary representation and (2) fictive or authoritarian representation. The first model matches perfectly with the scopes of his theory of conventional institution of the commonwealth, whereas the second solution, dismissed in Leviathan as contradictory, becomes after Hobbes the classical model of political representation and the cornerstone of liberal constitutionalism. To the fiction of a conventional institution of the commonwealth Hobbes opposes the real world natural foundation by force and conquest based on (3) a third model of despotic representation, which as a result is equivalent to the voluntary institution based on true representation.

In chapter XVI of Leviathan Hobbes presents two possible legal models of political representation, (1) true or voluntary representation and (2) fictive or authoritarian representation. The first model matches perfectly with the scopes of his theory of conventional institution of the commonwealth, whereas the second solution, dismissed in Leviathan as contradictory, becomes after Hobbes the classical model of political representation and the cornerstone of liberal constitutionalism. To the fiction of a conventional institution of the commonwealth Hobbes opposes the real world natural foundation by force and conquest based on (3) a third model of despotic representation, which as a result is equivalent to the voluntary institution based on true representation.

This (October 2016 version of an) unpublished draft paper tries to answer a question that would have embarrassed Hobbes himself: which type of representation model among those analyzed in chapter XVI of Leviathan corresponds to the political theory propounded in part II ? I show why Hobbes has to dismiss what he calls fictive representation as contradictory with the individualist and nominalist premises of his doctrine of voluntary institution of a commonwealth; why he has to promote (and in fact promotes at the beginning of part II of Leviathan) a model of true political representation (in which the authors and the represented are the same participating individuals and the sovereign is an individual as well); why ultimately there is no difference between an imaginary conventional institution of the commonwealth and a forceful foundation by conquest; and why for the same reason  true representation based on consent assimilated to deterministic will is equivalent with a third model or subspecies of despotic representation in which the “actor makes himself the author”.